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ABSTRACT 
In the past Compliance Management has often failed, the Volkswagen emissions scandal 
just being one prominent example. Not everything has to be reinvented, and not every-
thing that companies have done in the past regarding Compliance is wrong. But it is 
about time to think Compliance in new ways. What does “Compliance Management 2.0” 
really depend on? The following article aims at laying out the cornerstones for enduring 
effective Compliance which amongst others comprises sincerity and credibility and a mor-
al foundation. Furthermore, the commitment and role model behavior of top managers 
and the training of line managers are crucial for the effectiveness of any Compliance 
Management System (CMS). Ultimately, for Compliance to function efficiently the ef-




STEPHAN GRÜNINGER & LISA SCHÖTTL  |  RETHINKING COMPLIANCE – ESSENTIAL CORNER-STONES FOR MORE  
EFFECTIVENESS IN COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
PAGE  5 
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 2   2017 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.	 INTRODUCTION: COMPLIANCE 1.0 DID NOT WORK UND CANNOT 
WORK 6	
II.	 CORNERSTONES FOR ENDURING EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE 7	
A.	 Sincerity and Credibility 7	
B.	 Moral Foundation of Compliance 12	
C.	 Seizure of results of company-internal investigations 13	
III.	 CMS IMPLEMNENTATION GUIDANCE 14	
 
   
	
	
STEPHAN GRÜNINGER & LISA SCHÖTTL  |  RETHINKING COMPLIANCE – ESSENTIAL CORNER-STONES FOR MORE  
EFFECTIVENESS IN COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
PAGE  6 
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 2   2017 
I. INTRODUCTION: COMPLIANCE 1.0 DID NOT WORK UND CANNOT 
WORK 
 
Several past and recent real-life cases illustrate that non-Compliance can often not be 
prevented despite the existence of professional wide-spread corporate Compliance pro-
grams in the respective organizations. Already the textbook-case number one regarding 
bad corporate governance and corporate ethics, Enron, which was uncovered in October 
2001 is a prime example for excessive accounting fraud. It exemplifies that common 
Compliance programs do not seem to be able to prevent misbehavior in and by compa-
nies: „Enron had an extensive and award-winning code of ethics and corporate govern-
ance structure. […] The problem was failure to follow these policies and to develop an 
ethical, law-Compliance culture within the company.”1 
 
A not less startling case is the Siemens corruption scandal. It was uncovered in Decem-
ber 2006 and resulted in about € 1.3 billion of paid bribe money, until today an estimat-
ed financial damage of € 3 billion for fines and penalties as well as fees for consultants 
and lawyers and further costs for the internal investigation. This does not even include 
the so called “management attention”, that is the costs for the time of managers and 
employees invested in interrogations, in revising the Compliance system (Compliance 
remediation) and applying it to their daily work. “When I started working at Siemens, I 
analyzed the existing Compliance structure at first. In fact all relevant rules were existent 
on the enterprise level, but they were not broken down sufficiently in the operational 
areas”, said Dr. Andreas Pohlmann at the beginning of 2008 at a conference – more 
than one year after uncovering the until then biggest (known) corruption scandal in the 
economic history. “The ethics rules lay in the drawer, Compliance was a lip service.” 
 
Not least Volkswagen (VW) must be mentioned as the company did already have to deal 
with a veritable corruption case in 2005 and the following years, besides the recently 
uncovered emissions scandal. As is known, the issue at that time was that work council 
members had received illegal benefits which included luxury travels and services from 
prostitutes as well as illegitimate bonuses to the chairman of the work council which had 
been authorized by the chief human resources officer and labor director (member of the 
executive board). The momentous decision in the engine development at the headquar-
ters of the company in Wolfsburg was made just at the same time. This then led to the 
so called “Volkswagen emissions scandal” ten years later. The implemented Compliance 
structures and measures following the scandal in 2005 were apparently not of a kind that 
they could prevent committing offenses of environmental laws respectively uncover this 
misbehavior which is now shaking to the very foundations of VW. Instead in 2013 VW 
was still listed as a leading company regarding the completeness of their emission state-
	
		
1  FREDERICK D LIPMAN & L. KEITH LIPMAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEST PRACTICES – STRATEGIES 
FOR PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, 198 (2006). 
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ments and their climate protection efforts.2 So far the VW case is not even slightly clari-
fied, also not what the failure of the CMS or the Compliance organisation exactly was. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that here too there existed a Compliance system that didn’t 
work. According to reports voices that laws were broken were numerously raised, but 
they didn’t get through to the Chief Compliance Officer or the management board. Or 
did they? 
 
Anyway, all three cases show more than clearly that companies can get into difficult 
situations when outdated Compliance 1.0-structures3 are in place. Enron had imple-
mented a code of conduct and Compliance-structures that were even award-winning, 
Siemens too had “all necessary Compliance rules” (which is not self-evident at the turn 
of the millennium) and probably one of the best CMS of big industry in Germany. And 
in a phase of setting up Compliance structures after a veritable Compliance crisis in 2005 
the Volkswagen group even managed to provide for the conditions that led to the VW 
emissions scandal one decade later – this can be called “maximum credible Compliance 
accident” without exaggeration. 
 
One could have also chosen ThyssenKrupp (corruption and cartels scandal), Deutsche 
Bank (money laundering, Libor/Euribor manipulation, fraud in the business of mort-
gage loans, violation against sanctions etc.) or HSBC (money laundering, assistance in 
tax evasion etc.) and many more companies as examples. They all have in common that 
the misbehavior was mostly “systematic misbehavior”. But this is exactly what Compli-
ance systems should make impossible. This also makes clear that Compliance Manage-
ment Systems will never be designed in a way that every single case can be prevented or 
uncovered, but there definitely are ways to foster the effectiveness of Compliance. These 
aim at establishing sincere and credible corporate Compliance efforts which are better 
suited to prevent systematic misbehavior than the old Compliance 1.0 systems. 
 
II. CORNERSTONES FOR ENDURING EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE 
 
A. Sincerity and Credibility 
 
Compliance 1.0 systems did not work in many cases in the past, i.e. systematic misbehav-
ior couldn’t be prevented respectively revealed. So far, so bad. But why did or rather 
why do Compliance systems not function so often in practice? The reasons obviously 




  Carbon Disclosure Project: Global 500 Climate Change Report, 8 (2013) 
(https://www.cdp.net/cdpresults/cdp-global-500-climate-change-report-2013.pdf). 
3  For the difference between „Compliance 1.0“ and „Compliance 2.0“ also see an interview with Donna 
Boehme, US-Expertin zu Dieselgate: Compliance bei VW ist veraltet, JUVE Verlag für juristische Infor-
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and credibility as a cause for the failure of Compliance Management. Both factors, sin-
cerity and credibility, are – as is shown – connected and depend on each other. 
The term sincerity refers to an attitude, a disposition with which something is done. 
Sincerity is threatened by carelessness, superficialness and occasionally also by dilettan-
tism. If one is “sincere”, then for the area of Compliance Management this certainly 
means that measures are only chosen in such a manner that the goal aimed at – the pre-
vention of systematic misbehavior (plus revealing and stopping individual violations) – 
can potentially be reached. Technically spoken this concerns the appropriateness and 
functional effectiveness of Compliance systems. Whether Compliance measures are 
accepted, implemented or followed, whether one has trust in them or not, depends on 
whether they are being seen as credible. The spectrum of stakeholders who do or don’t 
assign credibility can reach from the own employees (Compliance with a guideline or a 
business process), over the auditors that examine the CMS as well as customers and 
business partners up to government agencies (e. g. public prosecution department). If 
credibility is not transported, stakeholders might get the impression that the Compli-
ance rules and measures are hypocritical, that the company is just pretending its sincerity 
regarding Compliance. 
 
The consciously ineffective design of a CMS by the management is just one possibility 
which presupposes sound knowledge of the “criteria of sincerity” on the part of the 
decision-makers (management board). After all it is possible that this knowledge is not 
present or is incomplete – the wrong decisions regarding the design of the CMS are 
made in good faith in their effective implementation. If one thus delimits the “scope of 
failure” in this still young management topic, then, at one end, it is conceivable that a 
management board knows exactly what the Compliance risks are and how to mitigate 
them, but makes decisions concerning the CMS that guarantee its failure. Or – that 
would be the other end of the scope – an ethically motivated, but bad informed man-
agement board makes similarly inapplicable decisions that likewise result in failure of the 
CMS. Motives and competences, hence wanting and knowing how, play a crucial role 
here and are not only imaginable, but probably also empirically existent in every possible 
mix ratio. 
 
A well designed, thus sincerely implemented and therefore credible CMS focuses on 
promoting the motivation for ethical and legal behavior while at the same time training 
the competences of the organization and its members. The realization of workshops 
with managers on the topic of “Compliance & Integrity”, in which ethical or Compli-
ance-oriented conflicts or dilemmas are integrated, is essential for enabling decision-
makers to handle such conflicts. The training should be designed in a way that partici-
pants would have to work on real-life cases for which possible solution strategies have to 
be found and presented. The discussion of such cases should concentrate less on con-
crete solutions but focus more on sharpening the attention for moral topics in business 
and training the decision-making process. The individual’s capacity to balance argu-
ments and reasons and judge in appropriate and morally sound ways should be 
strengthened, also by learning how to integrate different points of view on a topic. In 
this context Werhane and Moriarty speak of moral imagination which is needed for 
creatively solving such cases and should be fostered in business: „Moral imagination 
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enables managers to recognize a set of options that may not be obvious from within the 
overarching organizational framework; evaluate these options from a moral point of 
view; and actualize them.”4 Such competences should be trained in regular workshops, 
but of course also by good leadership. 
 
In daily business, relevant information concerning compliant behavior is often – con-
sciously or unconsciously – overlooked, especially if it serves the interests of the respec-
tive person to stay ignorant about certain facts. Such “motivated blindness”5 can be 
prevented when leaders consciously use moral language and speak of fairness or honesty 
in business decisions which stimulates ethical reflection of the situation.6 The strength-
ening of ethically sound principles and decision-making frameworks is especially im-
portant since research has shown that non-compliant behavior is very often coupled 
with neutralizing strategies on part of the agent which aim at justifying a certain illegiti-
mate or illegal behavior.7 In the corporate context such neutralizing techniques such as 
pointing to a higher authority or to more valuable goals in order to legitimize the own 
misbehavior is especially dangerous if such a rationale is adopted collectively in a de-
partment or the whole company.8 Compliance workshops where the problem of neu-
tralizing strategies is discussed by using cases taken from the working context of the 
personnel to be trained can help destabilize such mindsets and rationales.9 Ultimately, 
this is a major leadership task which has to be supported by corporate culture in general 
in order to lead to the desired results. 
 
The positive effect of such Compliance trainings is, on the one hand, that it enhances 
the competences of ethical-normative reflection and sound decision-making in conflict 
situations. On the other hand, it “forces” managers to position themselves (in the best 
case up to the management board and the supervisory board). The managers have to 
“put their cards on the table” and thereby automatically reveal their true motivation; if 
they cheat and just pretend their integrity in the training situation, they will be exposed 
as “noncredible” in foreseeable time and lose their authority as leaders. Of course, such 
trainings can ultimately only be successful if the strategies and principles to deal with 
ethically challenging situations are systematically integrated into daily business. As Paine 
states in her book Value Shift: “Validation occurs through practice and over time as the 
	
		
4  PATRICIA H. WERHANE & BRIAN MORIARTY, MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISION 
MAKING, 3 (2011). 
5  Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns. Good people often let bad things happen. 
Why?, April, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, 59, 61 (2011). 
6  LINDA K. TREVIÑO & KATHERINE A. NELSON, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS – STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT 
HOW TO DO IT RIGHT, 101 (1999). 
7  This phenomenon can be traced back to Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance; LEON FESTINGER, A 
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
8  Hendrik Schneider, Cognitive Dissonance As A Prevention Strategy – Considerations on the Prospects of 
Neutralizing the Techniques of Neutralization, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 18, 29 (Vol.3 No. 2 2017). 
9  Ibid, 206. 
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principle is seen to be an integral and operative force in the organization’s activities.”10 
 
A further example for fostering sincerity and credibility of the Compliance endeavors is 
the use of an “Integrity Barometer” for measuring the state and quality of the imple-
mentation of a CMS and the ethical climate in a company. It should include questions 
on the role model behavior of managers, the credibility of the management board re-
garding Compliance activities etc. Such a measuring tool shall not be misunderstood as 
an exact method for objectively detecting the state of a company concerning Compli-
ance at a certain point in time, but as a dynamic technique that shows trends and devel-
opments and gives indications to special problems and to methods of their resolution. 
An “Integrity Barometer” should focus on questions regarding the implemented man-




Fig. 1: „Integrity Barometer“ 
 
 
Already the courage of executive management to question managers and employees 
anonymously testifies their sincerity in this regard – provided that at least some knowl-
edgability on the part of the decision-makers is given and the posed questions are rele-
vant. After all one has to anticipate that the feedback will also illuminate critical points 
in the corporate and employee behavior and thus consequences have to be drawn. By 
professionally implementing an “Integrity Barometer” the company respectively the 
management board communicates that one is sincerely striving towards a successful 
Compliance Management. This signalized sincerity produces credibility on the part of 
the stakeholders. Such a recursive relationship between sincerity and credibility also 
applies to a further important Compliance instrument, the whistleblower system. Com-
panies that commit themselves to implementing, communicating and monitoring such a 
system signal and actualize sincerity and receive credibility – because and insofar as they 
have to follow reports on grievances and uncover and stop possible misbehavior. A 




  LYNN S. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT – WHY COMPANIES MUST MERGE SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL IMPERATIVES 
TO ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE, 177 (2003). 
11  The Center for Business Compliance & Integrity (CBCI) has developed an approach for an “Integrity Ba-
rometer” in cooperation with COMFORMIS (a brand of digitalspirit GmbH). Also known is the so called 
“Integrity Thermometer” of Prof. Muel Kaptein. 
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the management board the possibility or at least makes it much more difficult to refuse 
knowledge of certain behaviors that could bring the company illegal advantages, like 
business contracts (e. g. by bribing end customers through sales agents) or higher profit 
margins (e. g. illegal price fixing of retailers). The management will more likely come to 
know such misbehavior that might provide the company with illegal benefits and there-
fore has to deal with it. 
 
The appointment of the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) may serve as a last example 
regarding its effects on credibility. Is a highly competent, in the company and from 
business partners respected and to some extent “powerful” person appointed and is she 
equipped with extensive authority and resources? Or is someone appointed as CCO for 
whom one could not find a suitable position for quite a while and who is considered as 
“harmless”? Is it someone who shall “form” Compliance at the fourth or fifth level in 
the organization and as a start has to request his journey for a “Compliance Check” of a 
business partner from his supervisor? Even if these questions describe extremes this does 
not change the fact that the appointment of the CCO is connected with the sincerity 
and credibility of Compliance Management in the above described manner: A weak 
CCO cannot manage an (intended) strong CMS. An (intended) weak Compliance 
Management doesn’t tolerate a strong CCO. By appointing a strong CCO the manage-
ment board signalizes that Compliance Management has priority and shall succeed. This 
signalized self-enforcement in turn creates credibility inwards (employees) and outwards 
(external stakeholders). The CCO should directly take care of a certain subset of all 
Compliance topics with regards to content (as far as possible the high-risk topics which 
in many companies will often be found in the areas of anti-bribery and corruption as 
well as anti-trust). Other Compliance topics will only be coordinated by him and possi-
bly consolidated in terms of reporting. Certainly some tasks, competences and responsi-
bilities of the CCO should be defined in written form. But it is more important that it is 
made clear that “Compliance” is an independent sphere of competence. A good lawyer 
is not automatically a good Compliance Manager. Also a non-lawyer can be a good 
Compliance Manager. Selecting the right person is supposedly one of the most signifi-
cant premises for successful Compliance 2.0. 
 
One can sum up that wherever the step to initiating self-enforcement in Compliance 
Management is dared, sincerity can be shown internally and externally and credibility is 
established. Wherever this step is avoided, affected stakeholders may interpret this as a 
sign of carelessness, superficialness, dilettantism and hypocrisy. 
 
If one accepts the mentioned Compliance measures as examples for certain “criteria of 
sincerity”12 and one takes a look at the company landscape, then one can assert that 
- high-quality Compliance workshops for managers with dilemma trainings are 
still an exception; instead one can find instructions on legislation and more or 
less successful web-based trainings; 
	
		
12  High-quality empirical field studies regarding the mentioned “criteria of sincerity“ are desirable. 
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- appropriate, anonymous manager and employee surveys regarding Compliance 
& Integrity are only conducted in very few cases; 
- anonymous whistleblower systems in general are not widespread so far and, if 
they are installed, are implemented insufficiently (especially regarding commu-
nication, training and motivation of relevant stakeholders to use them); 
- the position of the CCO is not firmly integrated into the corporate structure. 
Everything can be found, from the management board to some subordinated 
middle management position. Corporate flexibility in view of the necessity (e. 
g. because of uncovered systematic misbehavior), the corporate structure and 
size, the general risk exposure and internationality is certainly important and 
correct. But without a respected person with authority Compliance cannot be 
successful. 
 
B. Moral Foundation of Compliance 
 
“Compliance“ refers to conformity with a rule. The verb “to comply [with]” means 
amongst others “following”, “adhering to sth.”, “acting on sth.”. Hence, Compliance 
constitutes a restriction and always has to become concrete on the norm which shall be 
acted upon. The desired behavior is mainly triggered by external pressure. The central 
question is which behavior can (still) be accepted or is allowed. Posing this question is 
certainly relevant for Compliance Management, but it is not sufficient for a CMS to 
function effectively and reliable. Instead, a moral foundation is needed, for example by 
striving for integrity which refers to the consistency of values and principles, motivation 
and action.13 Integrity is tightly connected to honesty and truthfulness and can be un-
derstood as the contrary to hypocrisy. It can individually be considered as a “virtue of 
inner consistency” since the action of the agent has to be consistent with her corre-
sponding inner attitude. In the context of ethics integrity is regarded as an independent 
moral quality which is defined as acting according to morally sound values and princi-
ples out of inner conviction.14 The right behavior is governed by recognizing that it is 
morally right and because the agent is intrinsically motivated to acting correctly, she 
cannot avoid acting accordingly. She also asks what is permissible, but especially which 
behavior is (morally) right. On the basis of this reflection of her behavior she can give 
good reasons as to why it is right to act this way. Justice and law are also important refer-
ences for questions of integrity, but not the only ones. In the corporate context integrity 
rather means that a company commits itself consciously not only to legal, but also to 
moral behavior. This is realized by consistently acting on morally sound corporate val-
ues and principles in daily business. 
 
This can be illustrated with one example: Bribing in order to win a contract in foreign 
business is prosecuted criminally since quite a while. If one adds to this the – in various 
	
		
13  See e. g. DAVID BAUMAN, INTEGRITY, IDENTITY, AND WHY MORAL EXEMPLARS DO WHAT IS RIGHT, 14 
(2011). 
14  Cf. RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, 6 (1993).  
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countries certainly different – investigative pressure, there is sufficient pressure that 
companies and their employees comply with anti-bribery and corruption rules. In addi-
tion, the intrinsically motivated and reflected person will understand and acknowledge 
that bribery and corruption undermines the (ethically legitimated) principle of competi-
tion by which the most productive respectively the cheapest will receive a contract. Cor-
ruption hence prevents innovation and undermines the development of the rule of law 
and democracy especially in developing and emerging nations. These are all good reasons 
to understand that corruption is bad. By this insight (some) people are intrinsically mo-
tivated to act in a way that leads to the “right behavior” even in an environment of weak 
law enforcement, thus continuous effectiveness can be attained. Compliance properly 
understood as responsible behavior cannot be achieved without a moral foundation of 
the Compliance rules and measures – also because otherwise every inaccuracy of a Com-
pliance rule and every gap in the legal framework will probably lead to misbehavior. 
 
C. Seizure of results of company-internal investigations 
 
It is crucial to understand that the management board should regularly make strategic 
and operational decisions which prove the commitment to Compliance and Integrity. 
The management board and the (top) managers should thus be informed and compe-
tent on the topic of Compliance and Integrity. They should know the fundamental 
Compliance risks in the regions, business divisions and business processes. It is their 
responsibility to personally inform themselves in conversation with their corresponding 
managers about the implementation of the CMS and possible conflict situations or 
ethical dilemmas. The significant Compliance risks and the commitment to Compliance 
must be addressed regularly inside and outside the company by the management board 
and the (top) managers (town hall meetings, management meetings, discussions with 
customers, conferences etc.). An essential condition is that the existing incentives in the 
company in no case hinder following Compliance rules or even make exactly that impos-
sible. Ensuring this is a management task. For (top) managers it should be checked 
whether reasonable goals regarding Compliance Management can be found (implemen-
tation of the CMS in the own sphere of responsibility, handling revealed cases, bottom-
up feedback regarding behavior, values, Compliance commitment). These could be 
integrated in an existing regular target agreement where appropriate. Misbehavior must 
be sanctioned according to its severity (financial damage, reputational harm, criminal 
penalties etc.) irrespective of the person concerned. Summed up, the much quoted 
“tone from the top” is important, but the “tone at the top” is even more important. 
 
Distinctive incentives to reward Compliance to the law are not required, but appreciat-
ing especially moral behavior in the company can be endorsed. This could comprise 
financial and non-financial benefits but should especially include visible acknowledg-
ment of the model behavior in order to encourage imitation and reinforce ethical behav-
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ior.15 In the same way as it is important to increase the costs for non-Compliance by 
implementing sanctions it is advisable to lower the individual costs for acting compliant 
and (morally) right by promoting such decisions, e. g. with a Compliance Scorecard 
which is taken into account for premiums and promotions.16 
 
Albeit the right behavior of top managers is an essential condition for successful Com-
pliance, implementation of Compliance in the company is carried out by line managers, 
that is the normal hierarchy is obtained. Thus, every manager must ensure Compliance 
in his own range of command. The Compliance function (the CCO) should support 
line management in implementing the CMS in daily business and has a consulting role 
regarding business decisions and transactions (possibly together with further positions, 
e. g. the legal department). This also points out that Compliance understood like that 
can only function if line managers (purchasing, sales, production, R&D etc.) are thor-
oughly trained. As outlined above these trainings have to include practicing ethical deci-
sion-making. Then managers will be able to reach independent, well-informed decisions 
in conflict situations. Furthermore, then they can pass on their knowledge and give ori-
entation. They will be enabled to implement the CMS in their sphere of responsibility, 
fill it with life and make it a part of business processes. Only those who are able to speak 
will speak. That means managers trained in such a way will be able to contribute much 
more to fostering the much-evoked “speak-up culture”. This mechanism can be 
strengthened further when top managers (at least the management board, possibly also 
the supervisory board) participate in such trainings as well and position themselves clear-
ly to business-based dilemmas. 
 
III. CMS IMPLEMNENTATION GUIDANCE 
 
The question of the effectiveness of a CMS17 is much discussed. An armada of require-
ments and standards has been developed in the past years, as e. g. ISO 19600 and IDW 
PS 980 (for an incomplete listing see fig. 2). But in most cases the standards do not ad-
dress the specific conditions of companies and the context they act in when giving sug-





  Cf. Muel Kaptein, Understanding Unethical Behavior by Unraveling Ethical Culture, 64, HUMAN RELA-
TIONS, 843, 851 (2011). 
16
  Hendrik Schneider, Cognitive Dissonance As A Prevention Strategy – Considerations on the Prospects of 
Neutralizing the Techniques of Neutralization, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 18, 32 (Vol.3 No. 2 
2017). 
17  See Stephan Grüninger & Maximilian Jantz, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Prüfung von Compliance-
Management-Systemen – Gestaltung interner oder externer Wirksamkeits und Umsetzungsprüfungen, ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 131 (2013). 
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Fig. 2: Requirements of CMS 
 
 
A project that aimed at addressing the specific questions companies of different size and 
structure have when implementing a Compliance Management System is the develop-
ment of the “KICG-Guidelines” which were released in 2014. These represent the first 
attempt to describe suggestions for the appropriateness of CMS for companies of differ-
ent levels of Compliance complexity (size, internationality, risk exposure) in detail.18 
Several stakeholder groups participated in this project (representatives of companies of 
different levels of Compliance complexity, lawyers, accountants/specialists in forensic 
services). In a follow-up project these project results are verified with members of judi-
cial authorities, scientists, representatives of NGOs etc. in order to achieve a higher de-
gree of reliability19 and thus an incentive, especially for medium-sized companies, to 
address the topic of Compliance and invest in prevention. It is likewise important to see 
that the KICG-Guidelines were developed to give suggestions for both design and eval-
uation of a CMS and do not intend to establish a new standard (contrary to the inten-
tion of e. g. ISO 19600). This project was so important and is mentioned here because 
the “CMS Best Practice Standard” established in very big companies (e. g. DAX 30) does 
not fit to medium-sized companies and would completely overburden them. A CMS is 
ultimately measured at its effectiveness – regardless of whether it is the CMS of a very 




  STEPHAN GRÜNINGER, MAXIMILIAN JANTZ, CHRISTINE SCHWEIKERT & ROLAND STEINMEYER, EMP-
FEHLUNGEN FÜR DIE AUSGESTALTUNG UND BEURTEILUNG VON COMPLIANCE-MANAGEMENT-
SYSTEMEN (Konstanz Institut für Corporate Governance 2014); STEPHAN GRÜNINGER ET AL., KICG 
COMPLIANCE ESSENTIALS (Konstanz Institut für Corporate Governance 2017). 
19  Reliability regarding the (official) expectations about the appropriateness of corporate Compliance measures. 
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there exist in fact major differences as the project results show.20 
 
In spite of or even because of the many standards and recommendations it is probably 
necessary that legislators in Germany and all over Europe define general requirements of 
CMS and incorporate them into positive law. They should specify concisely what is 
expected from companies and other organizations regarding Compliance. A specifica-
tion of the OWiG21, as proposed from different sides22, would be a viable path for Ger-
many. Guidelines such as the ones from KICG or standards like the IDW PS 980 or ISO 
19600 could serve as references for the implementation.  
 
Furthermore, it is essential for companies and can only be decided there that the func-
tioning of CMS measures is ensured in an efficient, that means also cost-efficient, man-
ner. The approach “Compliance as a line function” helps here because it avoids excessive 
installing of resources in the central Compliance function and prefers a decentral organi-
zation instead. For measures in the area of Compliance to work it is important to achieve 
acceptance. Also for this purpose the manager workshops outlined before are an appro-
priate approach. The Compliance function has the task to call attention to risks and 
mitigate these together with line management. But independent controls and process 
analysis too are important to identify gaps and weaknesses in the implementation of the 
CMS. As with other central topics in the company it should not only rely on the under-
standing of the managers and trust in their personal integrity and competences, but 
should also complement these as necessary by (external) professional expertise in order 
to guarantee the functioning of the CMS. 
 
Compliance should be limited regarding content and with respect to business relation-
ships. This means that a company pays attention to not promising anything in the code 
of conduct or other normative texts it cannot hold respectively whose Compliance can-
not be controlled. In some code of conduct one can find the statement that “all UN 
conventions are being followed” which naturally sounds good – at least nobody would 
want to claim the opposite. But then one should also precisely know to content of all 
UN conventions. By all means adhering to human rights in the value chain is anything 
but trivial for globally operating companies. In many countries human rights are not 
respected at all, violations have an incidence rate of one. One may say that one respects 
human rights wherever it is in the sphere of influence of the company, but one should 
also point to the problems and to the limits of the scope of responsibility. In this con-
	
		
20  See Anforderungen an ein effektives Compliance-Management, Konstanz Institut für Corporate Governance 
– KICG (Aug.2, 2017), http://www.htwg-konstanz.de/Compliance-Pflichten.6958.0.html. 
21  Regulatory Offences Act (German: Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz) 
22  See Bundesverband der Unternehmensjuristen e. V, Gesetzgebungsvorschlag für eine Änderung der §§ 30, 130 
des Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetzes (OWiG), Frankfurt am Main, 2014; Deutschen Instituts für Compliance – 
DICO e.V, Compliance-Anreiz-Gesetz. Ein Vorschlag für den Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Schaffung von An-
reizen für Compliance-Maßnahmen in Betrieben und Unternehmen, Berlin, 2014. 
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text, the widely accepted UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights23 
might serve as guidance. They oblige states to protect human rights („State Duty to 
Protect“) and ascribe companies a responsibility to respect human rights („Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect“) which is accompanied by “due diligence”. By consciously 
delimiting and forming the own sphere of responsibility it will become evident whether 
Compliance is designed sincerely and credibly – or whether the diverse stakeholder de-
mands are adopted without further thought and reflection about how to meet them. 
Also regarding the prevention of bribery and corruption it should be stated more clearly 
where the boundaries of Compliance Management in sales and distribution lie. No mat-
ter how perfectly a business partner due diligence is managed, a residual risk that the 
agent bribes the end customer will remain. As of today nobody can tell a company 
which due diligence standard is adequate for exculpating an incident. Thus, it is even 
more important that companies clarify what they do and where they see the limits of a 
thorough due diligence process, also financially. 
 
The Compliance department and especially the CCO should be established as „trusted 
advisors” who offer a clear additional benefit to the operational business units. This 
benefit basically consists in locally developing and maintaining the competence of all 
business units to approach generally risky business with the highest possible degree of 
legal security and integrity. This naturally includes that some business dealings cannot 
be done. A Compliance department which merely sets and communicates rules, but 
runs off when conflicts arise, will not survive in the long run or will lose itself in insignif-
icance. This also points out that Compliance Management should focus on “top risks”. 
Regarding Compliance companies like to deal with the topic of “gifts and hospitality”. 
As interesting as this may be, the real problems lie somewhere else: bribing to acquire 
business contracts, offenses of environmental law, cartels, avoiding export sanctions, 
product liability etc. – those are topics that companies have to work on, in fact world-
wide, in order to have an effective CMS. The ultimately relevant Compliance risks of a 
company can only be mitigated if a CMS can give orientation on the topics mentioned. 
Only then potentially existence-threatening Compliance breaches might be prevented. 






  See United Nations Human Rights – Office of the high Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusiness 
HR_EN.pdf. 
